Introduction
The Southeast Asian haze is a major environmental problem facing not only Singapore but also the region and the world. The purpose of this paper is to study the political economy of this problem and take note of the obstacles that, unless overcome, may prevent a permanent and effective solution. The paper also puts forward a number of suggestions for strengthening the current policy regime for solving the problem.
The immediate causes of the Southeast Asian haze are clear and well known. Indisputably, the haze stems from the use of fire to burn agricultural residue and clear forest and peatland for both large plantations and small farmers, mainly on the Indonesian islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan and in some parts of Malaysia. Fires also sometimes occur as a result of vandalism and accidental ignitions in these parts. The winds transport the smoke from fires most frequently to Singapore and Malaysia and sometimes also to Brunei and Thailand.
It is widely believed that the El Niño weather phenomenon exacerbates the haze problem 1 either because of drier conditions allowing fires to escape and burn out of control or because farmers take advantage of the dry weather and clear more land than usual 2 . Indeed, all major outbreaks of the Southeast Asian haze from 1960 to 2016 occurred in El Niño years; 3 there is no evidence of haze occurrence before 1960.
Although the region experienced episodes of haze as early as in 1972-1973 and 1982-1983 However, this does not mean that the Southeast Asian haze is not a major environmental problem for
Singapore and the rest of the region or that Singapore has no role to play in tackling the problem. In fact, this paper also considers what Singapore could do, for its part.
The damage
The Asian Development Bank has estimated regional business losses from the 1997-1998 fires and resulting haze at over US$9.0 billion. This is in addition to loss of biodiversity, reduced agriculture productivity, contribution to global warming and loss in reputation and goodwill. to the loss and include it. The monetary value of losses from, say, the closing of schools for a few days can be quite subjective as there is no unique method for assigning a monetary value to non-financial losses. Thus, the estimates of the damage from the haze may vary both because of differences in coverage and lack of a universally-accepted methodology for assigning monetary value to non-financial losses.
The types of land cleared by the use of fire
Fire is used to clear land in preparation for agriculture or planting because it is the cheapest and fastest method to do so. There are broadly two types of land that are cleared in this way:
(A) Land with leftover from logging or old crop.
(B) Peatland.
As will be seen, the distinction between the two types of land is extremely important. It is worth noting in this regard that peatland is an area where organic material such as leaves and twigs had accumulated naturally under waterlogged conditions in the last 10,000 years. 10 This figure includes land that had been cleared previously and was already under agriculture or plantation use but was on fire unintendedly. Nonetheless, we shall use this figure for a cost-benefit computation. Less than half of the 2.6 million hectares that was on fire was of Type B (i.e. peatland).
Using the average of the cost estimate (i.e. US$2500 per hectares) of clearing peatland without using fire, it follows that the use of fire to clear land in 2015-2016 could have saved the Indonesian farmers and plantations at most US$3 billion in costs of clearing land. This is a miniscule amount compared to the damage incurred of US$47 billion, by the Indonesian government's own estimates as noted above. Even after allowing for errors in the estimates of the cost for clearing land without use of fire, the damage to the Indonesian economy alone from the 2015-2016 haze is far greater than the benefits to Indonesian farmers and plantations.
Although the relationship between the level of haze (assuming that it can be measured) and the resulting damage incurred is not linear, basic economic principles and the above estimates imply that Indonesia as a whole will be better off if it reduces the haze at least to a level where the damage to the Indonesian economy will be no more than US$3 billion, compared to the US$47 billion in 2015-2016. In other words, even after allowing for a non-linear relationship between the level of haze and the damage incurred, balancing the damage and benefits from the haze for Indonesia requires the country to scale down the haze drastically, 11 perhaps to the same level as in the 1960's.
The cost-benefit analysis above also shows that there is no conflict of interests between Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. All three have incentives to cooperate and help drastically reduce the Southeast
Asian haze, as they will each be better off. Indonesia will be better off because the reduction in the haze will lessen the damage to its people and economy more than the forgone benefits to its farmers and plantations; Singapore and Malaysia will be better off because they will no longer suffer from the haze.
This means that the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze or simply the "haze treaty" has the basic characteristics of a good treaty in the sense that its effective implementation will make all countries, including Indonesia, better off. This is true irrespective of whether or not Singapore and Malaysia make financial transfers to Indonesia. I had previously advocated financial transfers from Singapore and Malaysia to help Indonesia meet part of its cost of reducing the haze. But the cost-benefit analysis above
shows that Indonesia would be better off even if it receives no transfers from Singapore and Malaysia.
That said, financial and technology transfers from Singapore and Malaysia that are less than the damage they each would have been spared may provide stronger incentives to Indonesia to reduce the haze and still make all three countries better off. Yet, limited progress has been made in reducing the Southeast Asian haze. 12 What could be the reasons? 
Governance Structure and Implementing Policies
Ratification of the ASEAN haze treaty by Indonesia in 2014 had raised hopes for a solution to the Southeast Asian haze problem. But these hopes have been dashed. This is not because Indonesia does not intend to abide by the treaty, but because despite its best intentions and efforts it has not been able to successfully enforce land and forest policies designed to meet the terms of the treaty. In particular, Indonesia's Environment and Forestry Ministry does not have the power to enforce national laws regarding land and forest fires. It is dependent on provincial governors and local district-heads to monitor and ensure compliance with national laws and policies on the ground.
Most theorists and many policy experts take for granted the ability of a government to implement its policies and programs. But this is not always the case. A look at the governance structure in Indonesia can help us better appreciate this point. 13 For those familiar with environmental economics, it is worth noting that the situation described above does not fit the classic Coasian case of a polluter and a victim of pollution, since in this case the polluter is also a victim of his own pollution, but still pollutes more than the amount that is optimal for it. It is a case of not only market failure but also government failure. In addition, obtaining local authority by winning local elections is highly lucrative as it provides access to central government funds and power to hand out licences to businesses in the mining and agriculture sectors. Thus local authorities often buy votes for their re-election by giving land (or the right to use land) to local voters-often through the village heads, who then distribute the land among local residents.
Confirming this practice, Purnomo
16 notes that over the last decade forest fires tended to spike prior to and just after local elections. Weak enforcement of laws generally provides further support to this practice.
The following example from another developing country that also has a decentralised governance structure, leading to unresolved pollution problems may help us better appreciate the obstacles in policy implementation. This is not to justify the Indonesian government's failure to enforce policies, but to understand the causes of failure and suggest possible remedies.
The haze in India's Punjab province
Small farmers in the primarily agricultural province of Punjab every year clear and prepare land for the next crop by burning agricultural residue (stubble) from the preceding crop. There is just a small window of about one month between the two crop cycles, during which time the land has to be cleared and prepared for sowing. So, all farmers undertake the burning around the same time. The smoke generated from the burnings drifts downwind and causes a haze in densely populated cities in the national capital region. Although the practice has been banned, it continues unabated every year. Since most of the farmers are poor small-scale landowners who cannot afford to switch to more costly mechanical methods other than fire to clear land during a small window of time, the practice of using fire to clear land is not viewed with disapproval by the village communities in which they live. Government officials are afraid to enter the villages and impose fines. Also, they do not feel that it is morally correct to impose fines on poor, small-scale farmers who cannot afford to use more costly methods to clear land.
In fact, not imposing fines for violation of the ban on fires suits government officials as the elected local government does not want to appear to be on the wrong side of such farmers, given their large numbers as voters. 17 This is all the more so because a large number of would-be voters stand to benefit from the practice, 18 while the damage is suffered mostly by people far away who are not eligible to vote in the local elections. The people in the national capital suffer from the haze, but the central government, which is housed in the national capital, has little leverage over the provincial government-elected and empowered by the constitution to enforce national policies and laws on the ground-to stop the practice.
In these circumstances the only policy that may work, if at all, is a subsidy for using mechanical methods that do not use fire to clear land and a fine for using fire. Given the divergence of incentives between the central and the provincial governments, the subsidy will have to be clearly financed by the central government. 16 Purnomo, H., "Forest Fires & Haze: Link between Indonesia's Local Elections and Fires," Indonesia Investments, November 12, 2015. 17 Last year the Punjab state government tried to clamp down on the practice. It slapped fines on farmers, leading to agitation in the province. The drive had to be slowed down, if not abandoned. 18 Most political parties believe they will be voted back to power if they can deliver benefits to the voters.
The Crux of the Problem
Fires on peatland (i.e. Type B land) burn much longer and produce more smoke than fires in non-peat areas. They have been estimated to be the source of 90 per cent of the Southeast Asian haze. 19 They also release far greater amounts of greenhouse gases that are responsible for climate change. In fact, during the 2015-2016 episode of the Southeast Asia haze fires on peatlands in Indonesia released more greenhouse gases than released, for instance, by Germany in a year.
This raises the question: how much of the peatland in Indonesia has been already cleared and how much is left that potentially may be cleared and developed for agriculture or planting in future years? If there is not much left, then the Southeast haze may occur, at most a few more times, if at all. In that case, there is no need to spend energy and resources for solving a problem that is soon going to die out on its own.
But, unfortunately, this is not the case. Currently, Indonesia has 16.9 million hectares of peatland, of which 2.4 million hectares have been already drained and, unless rewetted, may be cleared and developed for agriculture or planting in the years to come or may catch fire accidentally. To appreciate the implications of this fact from a policy point of view, Table 2 summarises the spatial distribution of the remaining peatland in Indonesia. (ii) International Mire Conservation Group. Retrieved from http://www.imcg.net/media/download_gallery/gpd/asia/indonesia.pdf
The huge amounts of the remaining peatland in Sumatra and Kalimantan, as seen from Table 2 , are of greater concern for Singapore, since Singapore is most affected by the haze generated by fires in these regions. Although Indonesia has now issued a blanket ban on clearing peatland by use of fire and is making efforts to conserve and protect these peatlands, their existence is a risk and a potential environmental threat for the region and the world. It remains to be seen whether the Indonesian government will be able to enforce the ban effectively and protect and conserve the peatlands permanently. There are many risks. For one, the political environment and leadership in Indonesia may 19 Global Environment Center, Technical Workshop on the Development of the ASEAN Peatland Fire Prediction and Warning System, Kuala Lumpur: ASEAN Peatlands, 2010.
change and there may no longer be the same enthusiasm to enforce the ban. Another risk is climate change that, despite best efforts, may lead to the drying out of peatland areas, making them more prone to fire.
In sum, keeping the Indonesian peatland areas free from fire and protecting and conserving them forever is the key to stopping the Southeast Asian haze. Fires in non-peat areas are much less damaging and more easily controlled. Also, clearing non-peat areas using excavators or machines and chemicals is far less costly. Thus, a ban on using fire in non-peat areas is less difficult to enforce. A policy of subsidies for compliance and fines for violation of the ban on fires in non-peat areas can prevent farmers and plantations from using fire to clear land in these areas.
A Review of the Current Policies
Delays in the rectification of the haze treaty and failure of Indonesia to effectively combat the Southeast Asian haze led Singapore to seek solutions of its own. In pursuit of these solutions, it has passed the Transboundary Haze Pollution Act, designed to punish Singapore-domiciled companies or companies listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange that are engaged in agriculture and palm oil-related production and either directly contribute to the Southeast Asian haze or condone similar activities by their associates in the supply chain. 20 The Act has had some impact. A number of companies facing prosecution under the Act have become cautious. But it is too early to say how much difference the Act will make in reducing the haze. Ambiguities in Indonesia's official land ownership or user rights records make it difficult to effectively apply the Act.
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As the Southeast Asian haze made a return in 2015-2016, even after Indonesia had ratified the haze treaty in 2014, there was much anger on the ground in Singapore, and consumers were urged to boycott products from companies that used fire to clear land for agriculture or planting. Although the financial impact of such boycotts on companies is not huge as Singapore's consumption of paper and palm oil constitutes a small proportion of global demand, the boycotts can nevertheless deter companies from contributing to the haze as they would not want to risk bad press and lose goodwill. Singapore also has a Green Labelling scheme that certifies eco-friendly products. However, this certification is only for products to be sold in Singapore.
Similarly, Indonesia has instituted mandatory certification schemes such as the Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil initiative, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, and the Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge. But these schemes face challenges owing to exemptions for smaller producers and ambiguities in official records of land ownership or user rights.
Indonesia has a so-called "two hectares" policy that grants each head of family or a new migrant user rights over two hectares of land. Although the two hectares policy was initiated as part of a poverty alleviation programme, it has been misused as mid-level plantation companies could simply employ some of the locals to claim two hectares each and then combine these small patches together to form one large area for development and planting. It has been estimated that village heads and land claimants can extract benefits of up to US$856 per hectare if they clear the land using fire 22 and then surrender their ownership or user rights to plantation companies. Thus, despite a blanket ban on fires, the two hectares policy provides strong incentives to clear the two hectares by fire, in violation of the ban.
Indonesia has recently created a Peatland Restoration Agency (BRG), which is tasked with restoring up to 2.4 million hectares of damaged peatland as well as blocking drainage canals to prevent peatland from drying out. Re-wetting dried out peatland costs US$1000 per hectare.
23
The Indonesian government has recently unveiled a new strategy that focuses on preventing fires from happening as the cost of preventing fires is one fifth of the cost of putting them out.
Policy Recommendations
The recommendations here are aimed at strengthening the current policy regime and making it more effective.
In the case of Singapore, the aforementioned consumer boycotts can be made more effective if the names of the companies boycotted are publicised not just in the domestic media but also in the international media. This is because preference for environment-friendly companies has increased among consumers globally. In fact, there is ample theoretical and empirical evidence that consumers are willing to pay more for authentic eco-labelled products because of a general concern for the environment globally. 24 Additionally, Singapore has a 20 per cent share of the global trade in agricultural commodities, and much of the region's supply of palm oil, timber, and pulp and paper is traded through Singapore.
Furthermore, Singapore institutions are reputed to be less corrupt and accountable. Thus, consumers across the world are more likely to consider agriproducts and intermediates eco-labelled by a Singapore agency-that could be set up for this purpose-to be authentically environment-friendly. The possibility of selling products at higher prices globally can provide strong incentives to large plantations and pulp and paper companies in Indonesia and the region to follow fire-free practices so that their products can earn eco-labels from the proposed Singapore agency. Building a reputation for authenticity could be a slow and consuming process, but it can bring long-term economic gains to Singapore besides helping to curb the Southeast Asian haze. An added advantage is that, unlike the Transboundary Haze Act, which requires Singapore authorities to prove violations in Singapore courts, the companies seeking eco-labels 22 Purnomo, H., op. cit. 23 Jong, H.N., op. cit. 24 See for example Chander, P. and S. Muthukrishnan, "Green Consumerism and Pollution Control," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 114 (2015) . pp 27-35.
for their products will themselves have to provide verifiable information regarding land ownership or user rights.
Indonesia has already imposed a blanket ban on the use of fire to clear land. This ban stems from its recognition that preventing fires in peatland areas is crucial for controlling the Southeast Asian haze.
Thus, Indonesia ought to take all possible measures to prevent fires, especially on peatland and in areas near peatland. For this, the BRG may be given more powers and funds to enforce the ban. In particular, it may be given powers to prosecute and fine violators of national laws to preserve peatlands.
But despite preventive measures, fires may happen accidently. Thus, there would still be a need to create infrastructure for timely identification and suppression of accidental fires on peatland and in nearby forest areas. It has been reported that small farmers and plantations can get around the blanket ban by deliberately setting the adjoining areas on fire and claiming them to be accidental. To discourage this practice, no agriculture or planting should be allowed on land that has been burnt accidentally or claimed to have been so. Such land could be taken over as government land and left fallow for trees and vegetation to grow on it naturally or used for other public purposes. Such a policy backed by an appropriate law will de-incentivise the practice of burning land and lead to fewer fires.
In pursuance of efforts to control the Southeast Asian haze, Indonesia has now stopped the practice of releasing new forest land to oil palm and timber plantation companies. But for a number of reasons it may be difficult to sustain this freeze for long. In particular, since Indonesia is a major producer of palm oil, timber, and pulp and paper and the international demand for these products is rising, their international prices may rise if Indonesia's production and supply remains stagnant for a long time. A rise in prices will
give stronger economic incentives and lead to domestic political pressures on the Indonesian government to release more forest and peatland for oil palm plantations and timber and pulp and paper companies. This is highly likely because palm oil continues to be a strategic industry (worth an estimated US$18 billion) for the promotion of Indonesia's export growth, and there is also a powerful lobby in Indonesia that favours the growth of the industry at any cost. In addition, poverty alleviation remains an important goal and programme of Indonesia. Thus, it may not be politically viable for all future Indonesian governments to resist releasing more land under the two hectares policy. How can these additional demands for land be met without compromising the blanket ban on fires?
Given the weaknesses in governance and law enforcement and the huge cost advantage of clearing land by the use of fire, the current policy of leaving decisions on the clearing of new land released to the discretion of the recipient plantations or small farmers in effect amounts to inviting and tempting them to clear the land by using fire. This needs to change. Thus, to meet the demand for additional land, an agency, similar to the BRG, could be created and given the responsibility of clearing earmarked forest and peatland for agriculture or planting by using chemicals and land-clearing machinery. Over time, the agency could build a land-bank by clearing earmarked forest and peatland areas without using fire. Only land from this land-bank could be released to plantation companies or small farmers. No land that has not been cleared by this agency should be released to plantation companies or small farmers. The cost of clearing the land mechanically before it is released to plantation companies may be recovered from the recipient companies. The agency could also be mandated and financially supported to innovate and improve existing technologies for clearing land without using fire. To realise economies of scale in clearing land, the services of the agency, after it has built up sufficient capacity to clear land mechanically, could be made available to existing plantations on a cost-plus basis.
The BRG is currently preparing a detailed zonal mapping of fire-prone peatland areas in seven provinces of Indonesia that had been suffering from annual fires. In the same vein, it may be useful to also develop a forward-looking map that identifies peatland areas that are likely to become dry in future and would be difficult to keep wet as climate change becomes stronger and water levels drop significantly owing to deficient rains. Since these peatland areas will become prone to fire in the near future, they could be earmarked for clearing by the proposed agency and included in the proposed land-bank after clearing.
In addition to creating a land-bank, the need for additional land for the growth of the palm oil industry and agriproducts may be minimised by raising the productivity of existing plantations and agriculture farms.
Easy availability of fertilisers and pesticides can help in this regard. Additionally, easy availability of fertilisers and pesticides may discourage the practice of "shifting agriculture" that is prevalent among Indonesian farmers.
Since, the Southeast Asian haze cannot be stopped without preventing fires in peatland areas, as noted above, and the current Indonesian political leadership and government seems to have not only realised this but is also determined to protect and conserve peatland areas, it might be an opportune time to
propose an ASEAN treaty to conserve and protect peatlands in all ASEAN countries. 
